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I argue for an intentional conception of representation in science that requires bringing scientific agents and their intentions into the picture. So the formula is: Agents 1) intend; 2) to use model, M; 3) to represent a part of the world, W; 4) for some purpose, P. This conception legitimates using similarity as the basic relationship between models and the world. Moreover, since just about anything can be used to represent anything else, there can be no unified ontology of models. This whole approach is further supported by a brief exposition of some recent work in cognitive, or usage-based, linguistics. Finally, with all the above as background, I criticize the recently much discussed idea that claims involving scientific models are really fictions.

2. Models and Theories
I begin with a brief overview of the relationships among models, theories and the world I have long advocated (Giere 1988, 1999, 2006), but with a few changes in emphasis. This forms the framework for what is to follow.















By adding conditions and constraints to the principled models one can generate families of representational models that can be used to represent things in the world.​[1]​ Continuing the example, by adding Newton’s gravitational law one can generate models of two body interactions in three dimensional space. Adding further constraints one can, famously, construct models to represent the motion of a projectile in a uniform gravitational field as well as the motion of two bodies in free space. Eventually one gets to a fully specified model of some particular real system such as the Earth and the Moon. A more fine-grained version of Figure 1 would, therefore, also show a whole hierarchy of representational models ranging from very general down, finally, to a model of a specific real system.
	How does one connect abstract models to specific real physical systems? This requires at least two processes which I call “interpretation” and “identification” (Giere, 1988, pp. 74-76). For interpretation, elements of an abstract principled model are provided with general physical interpretations such as “mass,” “position,” and “velocity.” Typically, most such interpretations are already present in the statements that define the principled models. Scientists do not begin with an “uninterpreted” formalism and then “add” interpretations. For identification, elements of a representational model are identified of with elements of the real system. Do we, as theorists of science, need to give a more detailed account of the processes of interpretation and identification? I think not. We can pass this job off to linguists and cognitive scientists. We know it can be done because it is done. That is enough for our purposes.
	A “hypothesis” for me is a claim (statement) that a fully interpreted and specified model fits a particular real system more or less well. So an interpreted representational model of two moving bodies under gravitational attraction can be fully specified by designating one body as the Earth and the other as the Moon with their respective masses, positions and velocities. One can, of course, also generalize hypotheses to include, for example, other planet-moon systems in the Solar System.
	Fully specified representational models are tested by comparison with models of data, not directly with data, which are part of the world. So it is a model-model comparison, not a model-world comparison. The move from data to models of data requires models of experiments and involves statistical and other data processing techniques, empirical information from other sources, and many other things in addition. Once again, a more detailed version of Figure 1 would include the complexities of moving up from data to models of data.
	I am, of course, aware that scientists and others use such terms as “principle,” “theory,” “law,” “model,” and “data” in various ways, not always consistently. So I am regimenting the use of these terms in the interest of developing a systematic account of a component of scientific practice. I think my scheme does capture a significant part of scientific practice. And most of what scientists and other theorists of science want to say about this practice can be accommodated within my framework.











principles from non-relativistic quantum theory. The second term was a “correction term” employing principles from relativistic quantum theory. Technically, this equation is logically inconsistent. Yet the physicists involved had no difficulty working with the resulting model. Nor is this at all an unusual situation in the sciences.


















	Now we can ask: what is the desired relationship between a representational model and the world? My view is that, for moderately complex models, especially ones defined in terms of continuous functions, claims of perfect fit cannot be justified. More precisely, the only model that might be claimed to exhibit a perfect fit to the world would have to be a model that fit everything perfectly. Here is the argument. Consider a representational model that does not apply to everything. Then the things to which it does not apply might have causal connections to the things that are represented. But we cannot know what all those possible connections might be. So, the only candidate model that could justifiably be claimed to be a perfectly fitting model of anything would have to be a model of everything. The prospects for creating any such model are nil. Note that, in this discussion, “fit” means “total fit,” that is, the fit of most or all the elements of the representational model to aspects of the world, not just fit between a representational model and a model of the data.
	At least for quantitative models, the above argument also rules out characterizing the desired relationship between representational models and the world as isomorphism (or partial isomorphism). That would be the same as perfect fit (or partial perfect fit).
	Nor can we invoke truth as the desired relationship between models and the world. Whether abstract or physical, models are objects, not linguistic entities, although abstract models may be defined using linguistic resources. So models are not even candidates for truth or falsity. On the other hand, hypotheses, that is, claims that a model fits the world more or less well are linguistic entities and so can be true or false. So can claims about the relative fit of aspects of a model, such as the period of the Moon’s orbit around the Earth in a two body model. Here, however, “truth” must be understood in its vague, every day sense, and not as “exact truth.”​[4]​
	I think that claims of “imperfect fit” or “vague truth” are equivalent to claims of similarity between a model and a real system. Of course this relationship must be qualified at least in terms of respects and degrees, and, as will be argued in more detail below, those qualifications must be intentionally specified. So, I still maintain that the desired relationship between models and the world is similarity (or “fit”, etc.).
	Once one adopts similarity as the desired relationship between models and the world, one automatically gets an account of what is usually called abstraction or idealization. Representational models are automatically abstract and idealized. Another advantage of invoking intentional similarity as the desired relationship between models and the world is that one’s understanding of both abstract and concrete models (e.g., Watson’s tin and cardboard model of DNA) is the same. No separate account of representation using concrete models is required.

3. Scientific Representation 
I have called some models “representational,” but I have not yet said what makes a model a representation of something in the world, or how some models represent things in the world. I have already said that representation with models cannot just be a matter of a similarity between a model and the thing modeled. There are two major reasons why this is so. First, we need to know which similarities matter. That there will always be some similarities is vacuously true. Second, as Suárez (2004) has emphasized, similarity is a symmetrical relation while representation is asymmetrical. 
	If we add the intensions of an agent or agents, both of these problems disappear. The formula is: Agents 1) intend; 2) to use model, M; 3) to represent a part of the world, W; 4) for some purpose, P.  So agents specify which similarities are intended, and for what purpose. This conception eliminates the problem of multiple similarities and introduces the necessary asymmetry. I propose to call this “The Intentional Conception of Scientific Representation.”​[5]​  It will be noted that this conception presupposes a notion of representation in general. I doubt that it is possible to give a non-circular account of representation in general.
	The intentional conception of representation using models is most clearly seen in the case of idiosyncratic models. I once saw a nuclear physicist use a pencil to help explain how a beam of protons could be spin polarized. Using the pencil to represent the beam, he pointed it in a shallow slant toward the middle of a table explaining that protons hitting the surface at a glancing angle would mostly spin forward just like tennis balls hitting the court after being served. There was no actual tennis ball present. There is clearly no intrinsic representational relationship between a pencil and a beam of protons. Of course, the shape of a pencil makes it appropriate to use for representing a beam of protons. But that similarity has to be invoked. It is not by itself what makes the pencil a representation of a beam of protons. The same goes for the imagined tennis ball.
	Because of the usual focus on conventional symbolic means for representation, we typically fail to notice the intentional aspect of symbolic communication. So the picture, on a standard conception, seems to be that shown in Figure 4.


Here the model somehow “directly” represents the object. On the intentional conception, by contrast, the picture is more complex, as show in Figure 5.


	Among intentional acts of representation, one cannot make a sharp distinction between those that are “successful” and those that are “unsuccessful.” The most experimental methods can reveal is how well a model fits various aspects of its intended target. How well is “well enough” may depend on individual or communal understandings of current standards in force in particular scientific specialties, or simply on the purpose for which a model is being employed.
	Although some models are physical objects, most of the models used in the sciences are abstract. So do we, as philosophers of science, need an ontology of abstract objects? My view is that, although an ontology for abstract objects might in general be nice, philosophers of science do not need one to understand the role of abstract models in science? It is enough to know that constructing abstract objects is a natural capacity of creatures possessing language. Language gives us the ability to create all sorts of possible objects that never become actual.
	Invoking an intentional conception of models and representation might seem to be an ad hoc maneuver designed to save the role of similarity in scientific representation. There are, however, philosophical precedents in the works of Wittgenstein and Paul Grice (1969). Fortunately, there is also a general approach to language and linguistics that provides a solid foundation for the intentional view. One version goes under the name of “cognitive linguistics” as practiced, for example, by George Lakoff (1987). In this paper I will invoke Michael Tomasello’s “Usage Based Theory of Language.”

4. A Usage-Based Theory of Language
I regard Michael Tomasello’s Constructing a Language: A Usage-Based Theory of Language Acquisition (2003) as currently the best version of this non-generative, indeed, explicitly anti-Chomskian, theory of language. As one can see from the title, he presents his account as a theory of “language acquisition” rather than language in general. In line with this orientation, the book contains discussions of many empirical studies of the early acquisition of various components of language. I will not comment on these aspects of his work since it also serves as a theory of language in general because it implicitly includes an account of what it is that is learned. This all applies especially well to our case because learning a science, or a new approach to an established field of inquiry, is partly a matter of acquiring new additions to one’s native language.
	Tomasello sometimes refers to his “usage-based linguistics” as “cognitive-functional linguistics.” Thus, he claims that “someone uses a piece of language with a certain communicative function, and so we may say that that piece of language has a certain function” (3) He also thinks of language learning “as integrated with other cognitive and social-cognitive skills.” He emphasizes two sets of skills which he claims “basically define the symbolic or functional dimension of linguistic communication—which involves in all cases the attempt of one person to manipulate the intentional or mental states of other persons.”
	The first of these is “intention-reading,” which has several components (3).
1) “The ability to share attention with other persons to distal objects of mutual interest.”
2) “The ability to follow the attention and gesturing of other persons to distal objects and events outside the immediate interaction.”
3) “The ability to actively direct the attention of others to distal objects by pointing, showing, and using of other nonlinguistic gestures.”
The second skill is “pattern finding,” which also has several components (4).
1) “The ability to form perceptual and conceptual categories of ‘similar’ objects and events.”
2) “The ability to form sensory-motor schemas from recurrent patterns of perception and action.”
3) “The ability to perform statistically based distributional analyses on various kinds of perceptual and behavioral sequences.”
Tomasello claims that both sets of skills “are evolutionarily fairly old, probably possessed in some form by all primates at the very least (4).” In addition, he claims that pattern finding skills are “domain-general, in the sense that they allow organisms to categorize many different aspects of their worlds into a manageable number of kinds of things and events … (4).”
	Figure 6 is a version of Tomasello’s picture of his overall schema. Here speakers direct their attention to a hearer with the intention that hearers direct their attention both to the speaker and to some particular state of affairs. In 


Tomasello’s own picture, the state of affairs is typically a visible object of some sort, although it could also be a visible process. In my version, the state of affairs is more abstract. Here speakers intend that hearers should understand that they are being asked to consider (or believe, etc.) the claim that M is to be taken as a model of W. This sort of situation sometimes exists in actual scientific practice when a speaker addresses one or more hearers in person. More often, of course, a scientist is addressing colleagues through some medium, such as a publication.
	One should compare Figure 6 with my picture of the intentional conception of scientific representation in Figure 5. The main difference between these two pictures is that the cognitive-functional conception of language emphasizes the communicational functions of language. The communicational function, however, is still there in my intentional account, even if the audience is not immediately present but only potentially present as readers of a scientific paper.
	This usage-based theory of language has the great advantage that it makes it possible to understand how language could have evolved in humans without positing an underlying universal grammar for which there seems no plausible evolutionary just-story.​[6]​ It contrasts strongly with the view that language is a kind of logic. Indeed, on a usage-based account, syntax is not the foundation for a language, but emerges through practice by a process called “grammaticalization.” 
	This enough about a usage-based approach to language to show that introducing intentions into our conception of how models may be used to represent parts of the world is not ad hoc, but in line with a growing movement in the study of language which links it to other cognitive process studied in the cognitive sciences.

5. Models and Fictions
There has recently been much talk about the relationship between models and fictions.​[7]​ Discussion of this relationship has often taken the form of a question:  “Are Models Fictions”? I find his way of framing the issue is misleading. It may easily be understood as presupposing that the prior questions, “What is a model?” and “What is a fiction?” have definite answers. Given the variety of things that can be used as models, the first question has no clear answer. I presume the same is true of the second question. So one cannot simply inspect the answers to the latter two questions and read off an answer to the original question. Thus, the original question should really be framed as whether it is useful for the project of understanding scientific practice to think of some standard sorts of models as being like prototypical fictions.
	Why would one want to associate models with fictions in the first place? The apparent motivation is the simple fact that models cannot exhibit a perfect fit to any real system, or cannot justifiably be claimed to do so, or are often explicitly known not to provide a perfect fit. But this consideration hardly shows that claims about the good fit of models to the world are fictions. We know there are no mass points, frictionless motions, perfect vacuums, perfectly flat space-time regions, etc. Yet models incorporating such idealizations figure prominently in standard scientific models which often provide a very good fit to their objects. It violates scientific practice to regard claims of good fit for these models as fictional.
	In fact, the argument from imperfect fit to fiction proves far too much. It is a commonplace of cognitive science that all thought and communication involves idealized categories, stereotypes being a prominent example of this phenomenon. Similarly, for several decades, cognitive scientists have argued that ordinary empirical categories are not strictly binary, but graded from central to peripheral cases (Smith & Medin 1981). So if lack of perfect fit implies fictionalism, most of what everyone thinks and says involves fictions. But that cannot be. For example, the contents page of the book review section of the New York Times has two main categories: Fiction and Non-Fiction. And although reviewers often point out mistakes in works of non-fiction, that is not taken as a ground for moving these works into the fiction category. The boundary between fiction and non-fiction, while itself not sharp, is well understood. It was well understood even by Vaihinger (1935) who contrasted fictions with what he called scientific “hypotheses” which he thought could be straightforwardly true or false.
	In fact, regarding claims regarding the fit of modes to the world as fictional destroys the well regarded distinction between science and science fiction. Thus, imagining light traveling in totally empty space, which we now think does not exist anywhere, is can be good science. Imagining the spaceship Enterprise traveling at ‘warp speed’ (faster than light) is science fiction. This difference is obvious to just about everyone.
	There is a connection between models and fictions, but it goes the other way. Rather than asking whether models are fictions, we can ask whether fictions are models. Here the answer can be positive. Take a quintessentially work of fiction, such as the novel War and Peace. In writing this work, Dostoyevsky can be regarded as having created an elaborate possible world, which is to say, a model of a world. This model in fact resembles the real world in many respects. It speaks of such actual things as war and peace, life and death, love and hatred. It was, indeed, intended to represent such things. But it is not a scientific model. It was not intended to represent actual people or actual events, except in general terms. It is no criticism of this model that many of its central elements, including the main characters, never existed.
	There is another motivation for wanting to think of claims about models as being fictional that is not touched by the above criticisms. This is the desire to further what I would call “neo-instrumentalism” but others might prefer to call “pragmatism.” So, for some at least, fictionalism is part of a larger philosophical project of anti-realism, or at least non-realism.​[8]​ This is obviously too big a topic to consider here, but the above discussion should go some way toward removing one intended support for neo-instrumentalism.
	One final comment. There are cultural dangers, particularly in the United States, in the claim that scientific models are fictions. For religiously inspired anti-science movements, such as “creation science,” learning that respected philosophers of science think that science is just a matter of fictions would be welcome news indeed. We need only remember how creationists and other opponents of evolutionary theory welcomed Karl Popper’s claims that evolutionary theory is not falsifiable and thus not a scientific theory, but, rather, a metaphysical research program.​[9]​ So the view that scientific claims are fictional is not one that supporters of a genuine scientific ethos should encourage. Indeed, in the present cultural climate, it would be irresponsible to promulgate such views in these terms. At the very least, supporters of this view should come up with another description of their views. “Fiction” is far too loaded a word. 

6. Conclusion
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^1	  Here I am in general agreement with the LSE School that theories can function as tools which can be used to fabricate models which do represent aspects of the world.
^2	  Explaining Science (1988, ch. 7, pp.183-84.) 
^3	  This third possibility goes some way toward accommodating the views of Cartwright (1999) and Morrison and Morgan (1999).
^4	  See (Teller, Forthcoming a, Forthcoming b).
^5	   This designation parallels Suárez’ (2004) “Inferential Conception of Scientific Representation,” which also has an intentional component. I regard the fact that inferences about aspects of world represented can be drawn from a representational model as being implied by the general notion of representation in science. But I want to add an explicitly realist understanding of the representational virtues of models. Van Fraassen (2000) has also recently introduced intentional elements into his empiricist picture of science.
^6	  See (Dennett 1995, ch. 13).
^7	  So far it has been mostly talk, and that at two workshops, one in Madrid in February, 2006 and one in Barcelona in July, 2007. The Madrid workshop will result in an edited volume (Suárez, Forthcoming) and the Barcelona workshop in a forthcoming issue of Synthese. The founding document for these recent discussions seems to be Arthur Fine’s paper on Hans Vaihinger (Fine 1993). Fine cites (Scheffler 1963) as containing the last previous extended discussion of “fictionalism.” 
^8	  Here I am thinking particularly of Arthur Fine, but also Mauricio Suárez.
^9	  Popper (1978) later repudiated these earlier views, but the damage was done.
